Markets vs. policies: Can the US dollar's dominance in global trade be dented?

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The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and not those of the ECB.

Motivation

- USD is the dominant currency in global trade invoicing Gopinath (2015); Boz et al. (2020)
- Important implications for dynamics of global financial system Caballero et al. (2008); Gourinchas and Rey (2013); Mukhin (2018); Gourinchas (2019); Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020)
- EUR initially thought to but eventually did not challenge USD's dominant status Chinn and Frankel (2008)
 - But why is a significant share of world trade still invoiced in non-USD, especially EUR?
- China is becoming an ever more important player in the global economy Eichengreen (2011); Eichengreen and Lombardi (2017)
 - Will the RMB be a more successful challenger to the USD?

This paper

• EUR vs. USD: 'Markets'

- International role of the EUR has been a 'market-driven process' European Central Bank (2018)
- Do market determinants of invoicing currency choice predicted by theory underpin the use of the EUR and thereby the limitation of USD dominance?
- RMB vs. USD (and EUR): 'Policies'
 - ► RMB internationalisation (so far) largely driven by policy initiatives Chen and Cheung (2011); Frankel (2012); Prasad (2016)
 - Has the RMB started to erode the USD's (and/or the EUR's) status?
- Exploit global invoicing dataset of Boz et al. (2020) for 114 countries over 1999-2018

Findings

• EUR vs. USD: 'Markets'

- GVC integration and bilateral trade integration with EA underpin EUR invoicing
- EUR invoicing generally at expense of USD
- RMB vs. USD (and EUR): 'Policies'
 - RMB invoicing growing along with strengthening trade ties with CHN, especially for SE/E-Asian/Oceanian countries, at expense of EUR but not USD
 - PBoC swap lines followed by greater RMB invoicing, at expense of both EUR and USD

- EUR internationalisation
- Theory on the determinants of invoicing currency choice
- Stylised facts on USD and EUR invoicing
- Regression results

2 RMB vs. USD (and/or EUR): 'Policies'

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EUR internationalisation

- International role of the euro "essentially a market-driven process" since Day 1 European Central Bank (2018)
- Reflection of a compromise between those in favour of internationalisation and those against (ECB neutral position to "neither hinder, nor foster")
- Very recently—after our sample period—more open attitude among European authorities towards fostering the euro's role
 - Concrete initiatives proposed by the European Commission (2018)
 - Support from EA Heads of State and governments: Europe's "strategic autonomy"
 - ECB support through sound policies, Banking Union and Capital Market Union that ultimately support the euro Panetta (2020)

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Theory on the determinants of invoicing currency choice

- Firm invoicing currency choice minimises deviations of preset from optimal flex-price Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005); Novy (2006); Goldberg and Tille (2008); Gopinath et al. (2010); Mukhin (2018)
- Vehicle-currency invoicing optimal
 - in presence of strategic complementarities in price setting
 - \Rightarrow Limit deviations from competitors' prices in destination-currency terms
 - ► when imported intermediates are used for the production of exports (GVCs) ⇒ Synchronise variations in marginal costs and marginal revenues
- Other determinants include FX volatility/transaction costs, bargaining power Devereux et al. (2004); Novy (2006); Goldberg and Tille (2013)

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USD/EUR country/time coverage in the dataset of Boz et al. (2020)



Note: The figure shows the global country coverage of our data on US dollar export invoicing shares. Different shades of green correspond to different numbers of available annual observations. For the countries marked in black, data are either unavailable (as confirmed by national authorities) or have not been requested. Countries marked in white are those for which data requests are pending. Based on an updated version of the dataset of Boz et al. (2020).

USD/EUR country/time coverage in the dataset of Boz et al. (2020)



Note: The figure plots the coverage of the data on the invoicing currency shares of exports over time. The left-hand side panel shows the evolution of our country count and of the share of world exports covered in the raw data; the right-hand side panel shows the share of world exports that our data cover after interpolation and extrapolation. Based on an updated version of the dataset of Boz et al. (2020).

Share of exports accounted for by US/EA and invoiced in USD/EUR



Note: The figure presents scatter plots of the share of countries' total exports accounted for by the US and the share of total exports invoiced in USD (left panel) as well as the share of total exports accounted for by the EA and the share of total exports invoiced in EUR (right panel). Based on an updated version of the dataset of Boz et al. (2020).

Global trade and invoicing currency shares over time



Note: The left panel depicts the evolution of the share of exports to the US, the EA, and the rest of the world in total global exports; the right panel plots the share of global exports that are invoiced in US dollars, euros, and other currencies. Only exports to countries for which we have invoicing data are considered. The graphs are based on interpolated and extrapolated data. Based on an updated version of the dataset of Boz et al. (2020).

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Regression results

Regression results

• We run regressions

$$S_{i,t}^{\ell} = \alpha_i^{\ell} + \tau_t^{\ell} + \boldsymbol{\beta}^{\ell \prime} \boldsymbol{W}_{i,t} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^{\ell \prime} \boldsymbol{Z}_{i,t} + u_{i,t}^{\ell}$$

- ▶ $S_{i,t}^{\ell}$: Share of country *i*'s exports invoiced in currency $\ell \in \{\$, \in\}$
- \triangleright Z_{*i*,*t*}: Controls (bilateral exchange rates)
- $\alpha_i^{\ell}, \tau_t^{\ell}$: Country and time fixed effects

• Explanatory variables of interest W_{it} include

- Exposure to strategic complementarities in export markets Based on Rauch (1999) and COMTRADE data
- Backward GVC integration Based on UNCTAD/EORA data of Lenzen et al. (2013)
- Share of total exports accounted for by US and EA Based on IME DoTS data
- Run regressions for 1999-2018

(1)

Unconditional scatterplots



Note: The panels show unconditional cross-sectional correlations between backward GVC integration, the share of homogeneous goods in exports, and US dollar/euro invoicing shares. The data are averaged over time.

Regression results

	USD				EUR				
	(1) Base- line	(2) Since 1990	(3) No EA	(4) No Europe	(5) Base- line	(6) Since 1990	(7) No EA	(8) No Europe	
Share of homogeneous goods in total X	0.27***	0.35***	0.32***	0.17***	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.05***	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Backward GVC integration	-0.10 (0.52)	-0.13 (0.30)	0.23* (0.07)	0.21** (0.05)	0.26** (0.04)	0.24** (0.04)	-0.07 (0.53)	-0.01 (0.91)	
Share of X to US in total X	0.61*** (0.00)	0.59*** (0.00)	0.57*** (0.00)	0.76*** (0.00)	0.05 (0.42)	0.05 (0.32)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.06 (0.23)	
Share of X to EA in total X	0.16** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.00)	0.30*** (0.00)	0.27*** (0.00)	0.16*** (0.00)	0.09 (0.15)	0.06 (0.32)	0.05 (0.16)	
Within R-squared	0.30	0.32	0.36	0.51	0.34	0.39	0.39	0.22	
Observations	1003	1045	711	454	1009	1049	713	456	
Countries	90	90	72	55	88	88	70	53	

Note: The table reports results for regressions of export invoicing shares. Inference is based on Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors. *p*-values are reported in parentheses below the point estimates, and * (**) [***] indicates statistical significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] significance level. Bilateral exchange rates, country and time fixed fixed effects are included in all regressions.

Regression results for import invoicing shares

	USD				EUR			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Base-	Since	No	No	Base-	Since	No	No
	line	1990	EA	Europe	line	1990	EA	Europe
Share of homogeneous goods in total M	0.24***	0.24***	0.24***	0.34***	-0.05	-0.06	0.03	0.04
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.47)	(0.34)
Trading-partners' backward GVC integration	-0.56	-0.56	0.07	-1.38	-0.43	-0.30	-1.20**	0.20
	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.94)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.50)	(0.02)	(0.55)
Share of M from US in total M	-0.16*	-0.21**	-0.27**	-0.06	0.04	0.16	0.11	-0.15**
	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.55)	(0.64)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.04)
Share of M from EA in total M	-0.40***	-0.40***	-0.13	0.02	0.43***	0.43***	0.24***	0.15**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.22)	(0.88)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.04)
Within R-squared	0.20	0.20	0.15	0.23	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.26
Observations	1082	1130	789	511	1080	1126	782	504
Countries	96	96	78	58	95	95	77	57

Note: The table reports results for regressions of import invoicing shares. Inference is based on Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors. *p*-values are reported in parentheses below the point estimates, and * (**) [***] indicates statistical significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] significance level. Bilateral exchange rates, country and time fixed fixed effects are included in all regressions.

The role of backward GVC integration

- GVC integration associated with greater use of EUR, but potentially only in Europe?
- Run regressions

$$S_{i,t}^{\ell} = \alpha_i^{\ell} + \tau_t^{\ell} + \beta^{\ell'} W_{i,t} + b^{\ell} \left(backwGVC_{i,t} \times \omega_{i,t}^{\ell'} \right) + \gamma^{\ell'} Z_{i,t} + u_{i,t}^{\ell}$$

$$\tag{2}$$

- ▶ *backwGVC*_{*i*,*i*}: Country *i*'s backward GVC integration $\ell \in \{\$, €\}$
- ► $\omega_{i,t}^{\ell'}$: Country *i*'s share of exports accounted for by US/EA, $\ell' = US(EA)$ if $\ell = \$(€)$
- Consider non-Europe country sample

Export shares accounted for by Europe and North America



Note: The figure displays the share of goods exports of the countries in a specific region that are accounted for by exports to /imports from Europe and North America. "S-E Asia" stands for Southeast Asia, "E Asia" for East Asia, "C Asia" for Central Asia, "Middle E" for Middle East, "LatAm" for Latin America, "SS Africa" for Sub-Saharan Africa, and "N Africa" for North Africa. We only consider countries which are also used in the regressions. The data are taken from the IMF DoTS.

GVC integration and non-European countries' USD/EUR invoicing

EUR vs. USD: 'Markets

Rearession results



Note: The figure presents the marginal effects of GVC integration on US dollar and euro invoicing. The solid black line indicates the point estimate, the dashed blue lines 90% confidence bands, and the red dash-dotted lines kernel density estimates of the distribution of the share of countries' total exports/imports accounted for by exports to/imports from the US/EA.

Invoicing and export shares for selected European countries



EUR vs. USD: Summary

- Data consistent with theoretical predictions regarding the role of market determinants of invoicing currency choice
 - Strategic complementarities favour USD
 - ► GVC integration favours USD or EUR, depending on trading-partner structure
- Key driving forces for EUR's invoicing role: Europe's
 - importance as destination for global exports
 - key role in GVCs
- How will these evolve? Especially in the light of the rise of CHN?

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CHN's rise and RMB internationalisation

- CHN has become a major player in the global economy, set to take off even further
- Natural question whether RMB will challenge the USD (Eichengreen, 2011; Eichengreen and Lombardi, 2017)
- So far RMB internationalisation is policy-driven process, e.g. (Chen and Cheung, 2011; Frankel, 2012; Prasad, 2016)
 - Pilot Programme of RMB Settlement of Cross-border Trade Transactions
 - PBoC swap lines
- Has the RMB started to erode the USD's (and/or the EUR's) status?
- Explore non-publicly available RMB part of the dataset of Boz et al. (2020)

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RMB country/time coverage in the dataset of Boz et al. (2020)



Note: The figure shows the global country coverage of our data on US dollar export invoicing shares. Different shades of green correspond to different numbers of available annual observations. For the countries marked in black, data are either unavailable (as confirmed by national authorities) or have not been requested. Countries marked in white are those for which data requests are pending. Based on an updated version of the dataset of Boz et al. (2020).

RMB country/time coverage in the dataset of Boz et al. (2020)



Note: The figure depicts the evolution of the number of countries for which renminbi invoicing data is available (right-hand side panel) and the median renminbi invoicing share over time (right-hand side panel). Data for Mongolia are not included to avoid distortions.

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Strengthening trade ties with CHN



Note: The figure shows the average level and change in the share of countries' exports accounted for by China for the 1999-2019 period, where "S-E/E Asia" stands for "Southeast Asia and East Asia". The data are from the IMF DoTS. Note that when $0.5(x_T + x_0) = x_T - x_0$ then $x_T = 3x_0$, meaning that trade shares accounted for by China have roughly tripled.

Regression specification

• We run regressions

$$S_{i,t}^{k,\ell} = \alpha_i^{k,\ell} + \tau_t^{k,\ell} + \beta^{k,\ell'} \boldsymbol{W}_{i,t}^k + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^{k,\ell'} \boldsymbol{Z}_{i,t}^k + \boldsymbol{u}_{i,t}^{k,\ell}$$
(3)

- ▶ $S_{i,t}^{k,\ell}$: Share of country *i*'s trade flow $k \in \{x, m\}$ invoiced in currency $\ell \in \{\$, \in, \text{other}, ¥\}$
- $Z_{i,t}^k$: Controls (GVC integration, strategic complementarities, bilateral FX)
- $\alpha_i^{k,\ell}$, $\tau_t^{k,\ell}$: Country and time fixed effects
- Explanatory variables of interest $W_{i,t}^k$ include
 - Share of total exports/imports accounted for by US, EA, and CHN
- Start regressions in 2011 when Pilot Project extended to trade with the whole world

Baseline regression results for RMB invoicing

		Exp	orts	Imports				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	USD	EUR	Other	RMB	USD	EUR	Other	RMB
Share of X/M to/from CH in total X/M	0.13***	-0.06	-0.07**	0.03*	0.12	-0.07	-0.05	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.56)	(0.20)
Within R-squared	0.18	0.21	0.08	0.19	0.26	0.32	0.08	0.24
Observations	575	580	579	214	626	621	621	259
Countries	85	84	84	38	94	93	93	48

Note: Inference is based on Driscoll-Kraav robust standard errors, p-values are reported in parentheses below the point estimates, and * (**) [***] indicates statistical significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] significance level. Country and time fixed effects are included in all regressions. The coefficient estimates for the share of homogeneous goods in total trade. GVC integration, exchange rates and US/EA trade shares are not reported to save space.

Regression results for RMB invoicing by region

		Exp	oorts		Imports				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
	USD	EUR	Other	RMB	USD	EUR	Other	RMB	
Share of X/M to/from CH in total X/M									
x S-E/E Asia dummy	0.24***	-0.34***	0.10	-0.03	0.73***	-0.28***	-0.45***	0.10***	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.11)	(0.28)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
x Europe dummy	1.13**	-0.56*	-0.62**	-0.03	-0.37**	0.69***	-0.32***	-0.05***	
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
x Latin America dummy	0.14**	-0.11**	-0.02	-0.00	0.34	-0.42***	0.08	-0.02	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.69)	(0.47)	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.69)	(0.11)	
x Oceania dummy	0.25**	-0.14***	-0.11	0.12**	0.71	-0.13	-0.74	0.12***	
	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.52)	(0.33)	(0.00)	
x Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.05	0.09*	-0.14**	0.01	-0.11	0.04	0.07	0.01	
	(0.43)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.54)	(0.74)	(0.71)	(0.57)	
x Other region dummy	-0.41*	0.22	0.28*	0.01	-0.17	-0.03	0.20	-0.05**	
	(0.06)	(0.29)	(0.07)	(0.61)	(0.13)	(0.66)	(0.11)	(0.02)	
Within R-squared	0.21	0.23	0.11	0.35	0.30	0.37	0.13	0.37	
Observations	575	580	579	214	626	621	621	259	
Countries	85	84	84	38	94	93	93	48	
Countries in groups	9/35/10/	9/35/10/	9/35/10/	8/5/8/	10/38/11/	10/38/11/	10/38/11/	10/8/7/	
	3/11/17	3/11/16	3/11/16	2/6/9	4/13/18	3/13/18	3/13/18	2/9/12	

Results for RMB invoicing: Summary

- Strengthening trade ties with CHN in general associated with
 - greater USD invoicing
 - at the expense of the EUR
- RMB invoicing has picked up only for some regions and trade flows, namely
 - SE/E Asian and Oceanian countries
 - imports
- Increasing RMB invoicing at the expense of the EUR

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PBoC swap lines and RMB invoicing

- PBoC has signed 40+ swap agreements with other central banks Direction Générale du Trésor (2018) as well as Bahaj and Reis (2020)
- Stated objective: Facilitate RMB trade settlement People's Bank of China (2012)
- Theory suggests swap lines may render RMB trade finance more stable/reliable Bahaj and Reis (2020)
- Some evidence for increasing RMB invoicing (or settlement) due to PBoC swap line Song and Xia (2019); Bahaj and Reis (2020)
- But at whose expense?

RMB invoicing for countries with and without PBoC swap line



Note: The figure depicts the evolution of the median RMB invoicing share separately for countries which established a swap line with the PBoC (left-hand side panel) and for those that did not (right-hand side panel). Data for Mongolia are not included to avoid distortions.

RMB invoicing before and after PBoC swap line establishment



Note: The figure depicts the evolution of the mean RMB invoicing share over time around the establishment of a swap line with the PBoC (indicated by the vertical line). The horizontal axis indicates years prior and after the establishment of a PBoC swap line.

Regressions for PBoC swap lines and RMB invoicing

• Run regressions

$$S_{i,t}^{k,\ell} = \alpha_i^{k,\ell} + \tau_t^{k,\ell} + b^{k,\ell} \left(PBoCSwap_{i,t} \times \omega_{i,t}^{k,CHN} \right) + \gamma^{k,\ell'} \mathbf{Z}_{i,t}^k + u_{i,t}^{k,\ell}$$
(4)

- ▶ $S_{i,t}^{k,\ell}$: Share of country *i*'s trade flow $k \in \{x, m\}$ invoiced in currency $\ell \in \{\$, €, \$\}$
- PBoCSwap_{i,t}: PBoC swap line dummy
- $\omega_{i,t}^{k,CHN}$: Share of exports/imports accounted for by CHN
- Start regressions already in 2008 when first swap line was established
- Control for additional measures of CHN's foreign policy in robustness checks Bahaj and Reis (2020)
 - RMB clearing bank, FTA with CHN, infrastructure investment flows from CHN

Regression results for PBoC swap lines and RMB invoicing



Note: The figure presents the marginal effects of PBoC swap lines on RMB invoicing. The results for exports are shown in the left-hand side column, and those for imports in the right-hand side column. The solid thick line indicates the point estimate, the dashed lines 90% confidence bands, and the black dash-dotted lines kernel density estimates of the distribution of the share of countries' total exports/imports accounted for by exports to/imports for CMN.

Regression results for PBoC swap lines and USD/EUR invoicing



Note: The figure presents the marginal effects of PBoC swap lines on USD and EUR import invoicing. The results for USD are shown in the left-hand side column in green lines, and those for EUR in blue lines in the right-hand side column. The solid thick line indicates the point estimate, the dashed lines 90% confidence bands, and the black dash-dotted lines kernel density estimates of the distribution of the share of countries' total exports/imports accounted for by exports to/imports from CHN.

Results for PBoC swap lines and RMB invoicing: Summary

- PBoC swap lines in general associated with greater RMB invoicing for countries with strong trade ties with CHN
- RMB invoicing associated with PBoC swap lines at the expense of both EUR and USD

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Conclusion

- EUR vs. USD: 'Markets'
 - Europe's GVC integration and share in global trade have held up EUR invoicing and limited USD dominance
 - Will European integration deepen further, stall or recede?
- RMB vs. USD/EUR: 'Policies'
 - Strengthening trade ties with CHN already associated with increasing RMB invoicing, albeit from very low levels, only in selected regions and trade flows
 - Establishment of PBoC swap lines associated with rising RMB invoicing
 - RMB invoicing mostly at the expense of the EUR
 - Will the RMB also challenge the USD?

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