

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

# Challenges in the wake of the boom\*

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
\* The views expressed in this presentation are my own and not necessarily those of the Bank for International Settlements. I would like to thank Matthias Lörch for help with the graphs.



# A long boom is fading out

Real GDP growth (ppp weighted average)

In per cent



Countries: CN,HK,IN,ID,KR,MY,PH,SG,TH, AR,BR,CL,CO,MX,PE, CZ,HU,PL,RU,TR, IL,SA,ZA.

Source: IMF WEO.




# Drivers of the boom: better fundamentals

Labour productivity growth<sup>1</sup>

In per cent

Graph 1




<sup>1</sup> Hodrick-Prescott filter applied to the logarithm of annual labour productivity per person employed.

Sources: *Total Economy Database*; BIS calculations.

- But impact of higher productivity growth fading out



## Credit a key driver in the late stage of the boom




Credit far outpaced GDP, especially in 2006-9, 2012-16




# Credit growth in turn driven by capital flows ...

... through cross-border bank credit<sup>1</sup> ...




... and through broader net debt inflows<sup>2</sup>




... and accommodative monetary policy

... in AEs ...



... and EMEs



# Three challenges for EME central banks

1. Maintaining credibility
2. Dealing with financial imbalances
3. Supporting economic activity




# Challenge #1: maintaining credibility

Headline inflation and inflation targets<sup>1</sup>

In per cent

Graph 1



AE = United Arab Emirates; AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.


<sup>1</sup> Annual inflation rate as of June 2016; for Indonesia, Korea, Peru, Thailand and Turkey, July 2016. For Argentina, shown on the right-hand scale, the inflation rate is based on the consumer price index for the City of Buenos Aires. <sup>2</sup> For countries following an inflation targeting strategy.

Sources: Datastream; national data; BIS calculations.

Most EMEs undershot or overshot their targets in late 2015/early 2016 ...




## Challenge #1: maintaining credibility



... partly in response to lower commodity prices and sharp swings in exchange rates




## Challenge #1: maintaining credibility



- Decline in external value of currency may also sap credibility
- But less so if inflation is under control



## Challenge #2: dealing with financial imbalances



- Expansionary impact of borrowing may be gone, but debt is still around
- Private sector debt reaches record level
- Government debt stable



## Challenge #2: dealing with financial imbalances

Early warning indicators for stress in domestic banking systems<sup>1</sup>

Table

	Credit-to-GDP gap <sup>2</sup>	Property price gap <sup>3</sup>	Debt service ratio <sup>4</sup>	Debt service ratio if interest rates rise by 250 bp <sup>4, 5</sup>
Asia <sup>6</sup>	12.2	6.2	1.6	3.9
Brazil	4.2	-30.4	7.4	9.2
Central and eastern Europe <sup>7</sup>	-12.0	9.2	0.1	1.5
China	29.6	-1.9	5.4	8.7
India	-2.9		1.8	2.9
Korea	3.2	5.4	-0.6	3.0
Mexico	8.8	5.0	0.6	1.3
South Africa	-0.3	-9.8	-0.3	1.0
Turkey	9.7		5.7	7.3
Legend	Credit/GDP gap > 10 2 ≤ Credit/GDP gap ≤ 10	Property gap > 10	DSR > 6 4 ≤ DSR ≤ 6	DSR > 6 4 ≤ DSR ≤ 6

Early warning indicators are flashing red in some countries




## Challenge #2: dealing with financial imbalances

Key balance sheet indicators of EME banks<sup>1</sup>


In per cent

Graph Number


Return on assets



Tier 1 capital/RWA ratio



Problem loans/total loans



● 2010      ▽ 2015

<sup>1</sup> Averages weighted by total assets.

Sources: IMF, *Global Financial Stability Report*; Bankscope.

- No major banking crisis, but profitability has fallen
- capital ratios are (still?) high and NPLs low.



## Challenge #3: supporting economic activity

- IMF expects EMEs to grow around 4.5% during next few years, much less than during the boom. Muted growth outlook reflects
  - Slowdown in advanced economies
  - Rebalancing in China
  - Adjustment to lower commodity prices
  - Uncertain external environment
  - Geopolitical tensions and strife
  - Demographic transition
  - Prospects for export diversification and convergence
- **All outside the control of the domestic central bank!**



## Challenge #3: supporting economic activity

- Expansionary monetary policy may boost growth in short term
- but may result in financial stability risks down the road
- Financial booms may also sap productivity growth through resource misallocation




## Challenge #3: supporting economic activity

Resource misallocations from credit booms hold back productivity growth


Annualised average growth rates

Graph III.3

2004–07



2008–13



DK = Denmark; ES = Spain; FR = France; GB = United Kingdom; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; SE = Sweden; US = United States


<sup>1</sup> Loss in annual labour productivity growth relative to a counterfactual in which credit grew at the 1994–2004 country-specific average during 2004–07; in percentage points. <sup>2</sup> In per cent.

Sources: EU, KLEMS; OECD, STAN; GGDC 10-sector database; BIS calculations.

Borio, Kharroubi, Upper and Zampolli (2016): Credit booms are associated with misallocation of resource in advanced economies



## Challenge #3: supporting economic activity



Marconi and Upper (2016): large misallocations of capital in EMIs.



# Setting priorities

- Priority 1: maintaining credibility
  - Large deviations from target may undermine central bank credibility
  - Low credibility could undermine ability to deal with inflation deviations, financial imbalances and low growth
  - Is the problem symmetric?
- Priority 2: dealing with financial imbalances
  - Address financial imbalances with macroprudential and, if necessary, monetary policy
- Not clear what they can do to support output growth without hypothecating the future other than smoothing the real adjustment



## References


- Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report, several issues
- Borio, C, E Kharroubi, C Upper and F Zampolli (2016): "Labour reallocation and productivity dynamics: financial causes, real consequences", BIS Working Paper No 534
- Hördahl, P, J Sobrun and P Turner (2016): "Low long-term interest rates as a global phenomenon", BIS Working Paper No 574
- Marconi, D and C Upper (2016): "Financial factors and capital misallocation in EMEs", unwritten manuscript



## Financial cycles in major EMEs

Real property prices and credit-to-GDP gaps in 2015; annual averages

Graph 2



A combination of high (low) credit-to-GDP gaps with falling (rising) real property prices tends to signal a peak (trough) in the financial cycle. The dotted line indicates the average credit-to-GDP gap three years before financial crises; the sample covers 34 crises in 28 economies since 1980.


<sup>1</sup> Deflated using consumer prices. <sup>2</sup> Total credit to the private non-financial sector. Deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-run, real-time trend calculated with a one-sided HP filter using a smoothing factor of 400,000.

Sources: National data; BIS calculations.

## Financial cycles are turning in many EMEs



## International capital flows



Large net flows, unprecedented gross flows




# Global factors increasingly drive domestic yields


Regression coefficients of local bond yields on 10-year US Treasuries<sup>1</sup>

Graph 3

A. 10-year yields



B. The term premium in the 10-year yield




<sup>1</sup> The coefficients indicate the results of a pooled regression over a 3-year moving window of first differences, based on quarterly observations. The specification is summarised in the annex. <sup>2</sup> Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. <sup>3</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.

Source: authors' calculations.

From Hördahl, Sobrun and Turner (2016)



## High external reserves and private sector assets



Helpful but no panacea

